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Abstract
There are widely differing conceptions as to whether healthy social relations are, in essence, conﬂictual or consensual; such
differences give rise to different approaches to ﬁnding peace and managing power. This article outlines the two broad schools
of thought from conﬂict theory (in which society functions through competition) and consensus theory (which sees society
developing through cooperation). It outlines the middle ground between them, as found by pluralism and agonism, before
considering the ways in which assumptions vis-à-vis conﬂict and consensus are reﬂected in different models of democratic
system and, in particular, different priorities for post-conﬂict recovery.
Introduction
Social and behavioral science has traditionally been dominated
by the presumption that conﬂict and consensus are opposi-
tional: conﬂict arises from incompatibility and consensus arises
from compatibility. This is reﬂected in two differing schools of
thought as to the fundamental nature of society and collective
decision-making within it. One can be broadly described as
‘conﬂict theory,’ whose proponents view all social action
largely within the terms of some form of antagonism or
imbalance. The other we can categorize here as ‘consensus
theory,’ which sees progress in society as only being possible
through negotiation and cooperation. This article outlines the
key features of each approach and the insights they offer before
turning to examine different interpretations as to the relation-
ship between consensus and peace. The article’s conclusion
draws on a range of disciplines in its argument that, far from
being polar opposites, conﬂict and consensus are two sides of
the same coin: both conﬂict and consensus are equally essential
to the functioning of society and group relations within it.
Nature of Conflict
Conﬂict is more than mere difference; it arises from a direct
clash in the values or goals of protagonists. The presence of
conﬂict thus infers none other than a win/lose outcome, in
which one set of values or goals takes precedence over others.
Power is at the heart of this dynamic; conﬂict is a struggle for
power, i.e., the capacity to enact values or goals that annul
those of others. And the process of articulating these values and
goals among groups thus becomes, by necessity and deﬁnition,
a political one. This may be seen in all forms of conﬂict in
society. Class conﬂict, for example, centers on a fundamental
inequality of power that spirals out from differential access to
resources. Racial or ethnic conﬂict arises from a challenge to the
values and goals of a dominant group that legitimates, and
indeed beneﬁts from, the subjugation of other racial or ethnic
groups. Gender conﬂict also, in its simplest terms, is about an
inequality of power as a consequence of the prevailing values
and goals. Conﬂict in all these cases arises from group recog-
nition of such a power imbalance and, in some cases, of
collective movement to redress it. Into this mix come leader-
ship, ideology, and mass opinion: all of which, again, indicate
the centrality of power.
Conflict Theory
At the core of conﬂict theory – in its myriad of guises – is the
belief that power (or, more speciﬁcally, an imbalance of power)
is fundamental to social relations. Social interaction is thus, in
essence, a struggle for control. Further to this, the decisions,
identities, and perceptions arising from social exchange are
imbued with conﬂict: ‘this way, not that,’ ‘us not them,’ ‘mine
not yours.’ This merging of contradiction with power results in
fundamental inequalities permeating throughout all society.
The major conﬂict theories center upon the most predom-
inant forms of inequality. Marxism, for example, is founded on
the premise that material inequality is the most signiﬁcant of
all power imbalances in society. Thus, struggle between classes
(the laborers and the capitalists, as Marx (1867) would have it)
is the overarching trope of western society, permeating into all
forms of political, social, and economic behavior and
outcomes. Where Marxian analysis differs from other conﬂict
theories, however, is in its assertion that pervasive social
conﬂict is primarily a by-product of the dominance of capi-
talism and thus will be eliminated when a more equitable form
of exchange supplants the capitalist system.
The use of the notion of ‘conﬂict’ to explain the develop-
ment of modern society reemerged in the 1950s, particularly in
sociology departments in American universities. A sociologist,
Wright Mills (1956), who applied conﬂict theory to advance
understanding of the effects of social structures on individuals
in the modern age, argued that the most inﬂuential public
institutions are founded, not on agreement, but on conﬂict and
competition. Their role ever after, he claimed, has been to
perpetuate stark inequalities in resources and inﬂuence, with
the result that social norms, values, interests, and decisions
thus all come to be shaped by a powerful elite. Social order is
thus ensured by coercion applied, through various means, by
those with power. Society is consequently stratiﬁed, with access
to advantage tightly restricted to groups already enjoying social
privilege.
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Whilst Mills shared Marx’s negative view of conﬂict, other
theorists have argued that the pervasiveness of conﬂict at every
level of society makes it, simply, essential to its functioning. A
contemporary of Mills, Lewis Coser (1956), claimed that
conﬂict must be recognized as a fundamental element of
human relationships. He argued that the struggle for resources
and recognition behind conﬂict serves the vital function of
stimulating social innovation and change. Coser built on the
work of Simmel (see below), particularly in his focus on the
role of conﬂict in the creation and maintenance of group
identities. Conﬂict acts as a means of socialization, through
which mutual antagonism can enhance group solidarity and
preserve social stratiﬁcation. From this perspective, Coser
critiqued overtly stable social relationships, rigid social struc-
tures, and processes of centralization for making violence and
dissent more likely and more intense. Instead, he argued, social
conﬂict itself should be tolerated as naturally functioning to
raise awareness of common norms, instigate conformity to
laws, and, over time, to generate new social structures. Such
positive analysis of the role of conﬂict was extended in the next
generation of US-based sociologists, among whom Randall
Collins (1975) made the contribution of further elaborating
the links between the macro-context and the micro-level of
personal interaction and behavior. The constant struggle for
status of each individual – and the conﬂict this entails – only
makes sense if one appreciates the stratiﬁed environment in
which (s)he lives. The conclusion he drew from this was that,
whilst inequality and conﬂict predominate in modern society,
competition and control are the drivers of stability and progress
within it.
Consensus Theory
A contrasting approach to understanding social and political
relations is to emphasize the vital role of consensus in society.
Durkheim (1893) argued that the most interesting aspect of
society is not its various dysfunctional elements but, rather,
the fact that it functions at all – something that he attributes
to the primacy of consensus in successful, healthy social
relations. Social cohesion is founded on the interdependence
of peoples, forged by social ties that range from kinship to the
exchange of services. This functionalist interpretation sees all
parts of society as working to uphold its solidarity and to
minimize instability. Societies survive, Durkheim argued, by
commitment to a common set of beliefs and practices –
a form of ‘collective conscience’ thus functions as the
bedrock of social order. Durkheim claimed that this solidarity
was created in a ‘mechanical’ way in traditional societies,
using rules to emphasize homogeneity and conformity; in
more advanced, differentiated societies, he argued, rules
instead regulate differences, necessitating a more ‘organic’
form of solidarity, or common purpose, between citizens.
Durkheim’s thesis on solidarity was advanced by Finnish
sociologist Erik Allardt (1970) in order to explain different
reactions to modernization in the mid-twentieth century. He
observed that, in order to function optimally, a modern
society needed to have a highly developed division of labor
together with a high degree of tolerance and pluralism.
A weakness in Communist industrial societies, he therefore
argued, lay not in the extent of the division of labor but in
their imposition of conformity.
That said, theorists in this tradition have conceded
that consensus does not naturally occur but is sometimes
founded – and sustained – through coercion (Shils, 1972). Yet
a process of socialization in modern societies modiﬁes the
behavior of individuals as they learn how to conform, or at
least what is ‘acceptable,’ to the society in which they live.
Interaction between individuals and groups can hence be
premised on an understanding of how each can be reasonably
expected to behave, i.e., the role each will perform
(Parsons, 1951).
The nature of consensus changes with the nature of social
communication and interaction. In the digital age, consensus
may be achieved (or at least sought) through social media and
online networks, for example, as much as through persuasive
political rhetoric or interpersonal inﬂuence. Just as Simmel
(1955[1908]) noted the effects of industrial capitalism and
modernization on the nature of social organization, solidarity,
and choice, so others, a century on, have sought to demonstrate
the effects of the new information society on social bonds and
relationships (Castells, 1996; Bauman, 2006). Even though the
nature and style of communication between individuals has
radically changed, however, their interdependence (or, to put it
differently, their lack of freedom of choice) remains as strong as
ever.
It is important to note at this point that consensus differs
from consent in that the latter indicates that each person con-
cerned offers his or her agreement, whereas there is an implicit
assumption of majoritarianism in the concept of ‘consensus,’
given that only ‘general’ assent need be given. One might say
that, rather than explicit and unanimous agreement as to the
destination, consensus requires only shared sentiment as to the
intended direction of travel.
Such consensual sentiment is maintained by a commonality
that is underpinned by shared attachment to core sociopolitical
institutions and acceptance of the norms and laws they
promulgate. This is not to say that interests and identities do
not diverge (this is inevitable in a plural society), but in cases of
conﬂict between groups or individuals, adjudication takes
place with reference to these ‘common’ interests and identities
(as deﬁned by laws and rules) and thus consensus ultimately
prevails.
Given the close interdependence of society, social and
individual needs are best addressed through cooperation rather
than competition (which would merely risk generating new
problems and divides). If shared norms, values, and institu-
tions are the essence of a healthy society, consensus theorists
conclude, conﬂict is almost pathological.
Pluralism
A tentative ‘bridge’ between conﬂict theory and consensus
theory emerged in the mid-twentieth century in the form of
pluralism. Pluralism recognizes that society is fragmented into
diverse groups that compete for resources and have conﬂicting
interests but acknowledges this does not automatically result in
nontraversable gulfs crisscrossing society. Instead, Dahrendorf
(1959) argued, advanced industrial society has found ways of
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ﬁnding agreement between these social groups, despite their
conﬂicting interests. Moreover, stability (and change) is real-
izable through institutionalizing this conﬂict, such as in the
role of trade unions in processes of arbitration with employers.
Dahrendorf thus allows for a functionalist emphasis on the role
of social institutions whilst maintaining a focus on the differ-
ential levels of authority in any society and their effects on
sustaining conﬂict.
Dahl (1967) brought pluralism into political analysis with
his vision of society as a mass of competing interests. He argued
that inequitable power and control was behind the construc-
tion of identities, capacities, and concerns of social groups.
Social order is thus only achieved by ﬁnding a natural equi-
librium among society’s component parts, with the state acting
as an ‘honest broker’ as groups battle it out for inﬂuence and
resources. And the nature of this struggle is neither overt
conﬂict nor consensus, but endless bargaining and
compromise.
Indeed, the politics of compromise has been advocated (by
Bellamy, 1999) as the logical response to the plurality of
identities, values, cultures, practices etc. in contemporary
society. He argues that the sheer complexity of the sources and
ties of social plurality today makes compromise a necessity, in
that the dialogue it allows between incommensurable
demands is itself a process to be welcomed and facilitated in
liberal democracy.
Consensus versus Conflict?
The matter of what should be set in place after violent conﬂict
remains, ironically, contentious in both theory and practice.
The perennial debate as to whether the eradication of conﬂict is
either possible or desirable is to the fore here. On the one hand
some claim that the resolution of conﬂict has to be at least the
aspiration of peacemakers. Galtung (1969), for example,
identiﬁes the structural and cultural violence (such as poverty,
oppression, or corruption) behind conﬂict as something to be
challenged by the goal of ‘positive peace.’ Others argue that
conﬂict is a necessary element of democracy and social
exchange. For example, Foucault (2003) inverted Clausewitz’
dictum (on war as politics by other means) to deﬁne politics as
war waged nonviolently by the state. Peace, thus, entails some
form of conﬂictual power struggle. This is, to some degree, in
line with the tradition of agonism, which seeks to acknowledge
and foster the positive beneﬁts of conﬂict for democratic
society (Schaap, 2009).
Yet there is common ground to be found between these
standpoints because conﬂict and consensus are not mutually
exclusive. First, the traditional ‘criss-cross’ theory of conﬂict
prevention assumes that the intersection of group identities
and lines of transmission reduce the risk of violence (Galtung,
1966); but for conﬂict to be present at all, there needs to be at
least a minimal degree of communication and connection
between the competing parties. Second, all but few agree that
deep differences among groups should be expressed politically
rather than violently. But this gives rise to the problems of
determining how best to give political voice to the groups
concerned and the basis on which the power is divided
between them.
Power-Sharing
Different conceptions as to the nature of society result in
different constructions of the democratic state. The
assumption in conﬂict theory that democracy centers on
a constant struggle for dominance between divisions in
society views adversarial politics as the most effective mode
of decision-making. On the other hand, democratic institu-
tions founded on the principle of consensus seek to incor-
porate a wide spectrum of opinions and to generate
agreement rather than mere decisions. Consensus democra-
cies, therefore, generally need a different electoral system to
that in majoritarian systems, one which allows for propor-
tional representation of the groups that constitute the pop-
ulation. This in turn requires greater political mobilization
among a wide range of social clusters than in other forms of
democracy.
The type of democratic institutions put in place after violent
conﬂict are often intended to build-in agreement to executive
and legislative decision-making and can thus be modeled on
a form of consensus democracy. Consociationalism, a system
originally conceived from the case of Dutch democracy as one
proven capable of creating consensus across deep social cleav-
ages, has been advocated as a model for power-sharing in other
divided societies (Lijphart, 1977). Proponents of the consoci-
ational template for democracy after conﬂict argue that it
guarantees all cleavage groups a proportionate input in policy
and executive decision-making and that it minimizes the
potential for systemic discrimination (Noel, 2005). Key
features of consociationalism that lend themselves to ﬁnding
post-conﬂict stability include executive power-sharing,
(segmental) autonomy, commitment to proportionality, and
veto rights (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006). Cases of the appli-
cation of consociationalism, or a version of it, after conﬂict
include the system of government in Bosnia-Herzegovina
established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement and Northern Ire-
land’s devolved executive after the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast)
Agreement.
Consociationalism has had many critics, however, many
of whom point to the elite focus of the model, in particular
its reliance on power-holding elites to bring cooperation
to the heart of the democratic institutions and for their lead
to be willingly followed. Problems can arise for example, if
the political elites are unable to bring their constituent
supporters with them (as in the ﬁrst years of the
Northern Ireland executive), if deep inequalities between
social groups remain unameliorated (as in Lebanon), or if
the consociational constitution is repressively prescriptive
(as in Fiji).
An alternative model of democracy after conﬂict is
centripetal, i.e., one which seeks to concentrate political
momentum toward the center ground between parties rather
than allowing it to fester at the extremes. This model follows
Horowitz (1985), who argued that intergroup cooperation
ought to be made a condition for electoral success rather than,
as with consociationalism, seen as a hoped-for outcome of
power-sharing. Centripetalism also seeks to avoid the reiﬁca-
tion of ethnic identities that is seen as a danger in con-
sociationalism by manufacturing incentives for interethnic and
centrist politics (Reilly, 2001).
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Peacebuilding with Consensus
Strong criticisms of both consociationalism and centripetalism
are put forward by integrationists, who argue that such theories
underestimate both the unifying potential of the state and the
peacebuilding capacity of nonelite actors. The importance of
local ownership of peace processes requires decision-making
mechanisms that reach through to the grassroots. Donais
(2012), for example, goes so far as to say that peacebuilding
should be pinned to the concept of consensus-building, given
its insinuation of inclusivity. Only by seeking consensus at all
levels of the conﬂict-ridden society and at all stages of a peace
process, it is implied, can that process be truly ‘owned’ and
embedded and minimize the risks of further alienation or
disaffection from the political sphere (Richmond, 2012). This
approach is posed as an alternative to the dominant one of
liberal peacebuilding, which is primarily a political, top-down
process in which international support can be seen as more
important than local endorsement. Consensus is thus coming,
in twenty-ﬁrst century peacebuilding, to be predominantly
interpreted as a requirement to recognize and engage with the
needs – and the wisdom – of the local population.
Conflict, Consensus, and Crisis
In the globalized world of the twenty-ﬁrst century, there are
new modes of conﬂict and consensus in developed societies.
These came together in the case of the Occupy movement,
which attempted to address stark extremes of social and
economic inequality through new mechanisms of consensus-
building. According to the slogan of the movement, 99% of
the mass population was counterpoised against the powerful
elite of 1%. As prime locations in international city centers in
2011–12 became occupied, the movement embodied innova-
tion in ﬁnding consensus. In small urban protest occupations it
used ancient means of human voices and coordinated hand
signals (see Figure 1); via the internet, it used new forms of
social media to advertise activities, disseminate ideas, and
galvanize support locally and internationally. Thus, in the
context of global economic crisis, social conﬂict reached new
extremes and social consensus was sought by novel means.
The Occupy movement itself embodied differing concep-
tions as to whether contemporary social relations are, in
essence, conﬂictual or consensual. As this article has outlined,
such varying interpretations of the nature of society give rise to
different approaches to the greatest and most enduring
collective challenges, such as those of managing power and
minimizing violence. Such assumptions also inform how we
understand democracy to function and society to develop. But
this article has also noted that recent scholarly contributions to
the debate have sought to identify a middle ground between
these positions, acknowledging not just the necessity of ‘both’
competition and cooperation in healthy social relations but
also the possible complementarity between them. Conﬂict and
consensus, it must be concluded, remain equally essential to
contemporary society.
See also: Agonism; Conﬂict Mediation; Conﬂict and Conﬂict
Resolution, Social Psychology of; Conﬂict: Organizational;
Peace Processes; Peace; Social Protest.
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